Statement by Bank of Russia Governor Elvira Nabiullina in follow-up to Board of Directors meeting on 13 February 2026
Good afternoon. Today, we have made the decision to cut the key rate to 15.5% per annum.
The economic situation has been developing generally in line with our baseline scenario. Price growth was rather high in January, according to weekly data, but nonetheless, this does not change the overall picture. We consider that this is a redistribution of inflation between late 2025 and early 2026. Therefore, it would be correct to analyse the statistics for the last three months in total, rather than in isolation – I will speak on this issue in detail later. The accumulated effect of tight monetary policy creates prerequisites for returning inflation to its 4% target. Thus, we have continued monetary policy easing.
I would now dwell on the reasons behind our today’s decision.
Firstly, inflation.
We will receive full data for January tonight, but as is evident from weekly statistics, prices rose notably over the month.
The main reason was the expected pass-through of increased VAT to prices. However, its effect has turned out to be stronger and more concentrated in January, as compared to a similar tax rise in 2019. Most companies had decided not to pass on higher VAT to prices last year, but did this in early 2026, which is why this factor had the strongest effect in January.
The second factor is price dynamics in certain volatile categories. At the end of last year, fruit and vegetable price growth was atypically low, while in January, it accelerated significantly, primarily due to weather conditions, which pushed up greenhouse facilities’ heating costs. Moreover, because of increased excise duties, prices for petrol, tobacco products, and alcoholic beverages were rising faster as well at the beginning of the year.
For some experts, January weekly figures were a negative surprise, which they perceived as evidence of a persistent inflation acceleration. Nevertheless, according to our assessment, the slowdown at the end of the year and the acceleration in early 2026 were both transitory, with inflation being virtually carried over from 2025 to January 2026.
Currently, annual inflation equals 6.3%, which is slightly below our forecast range of 6.5–7.0% that we expected for the beginning of the year. Thus, the dynamics of inflation are generally in line with our baseline scenario: inflation has approached the same point through its slowdown in November–December 2025 and its subsequent acceleration in January 2026, rather than gradually. This redistribution was the reason for lower inflation as of the end of last year. Taking this into account, we have raised the inflation forecast for 2026 to 4.5–5.5%.
The question is whether the effect of the VAT increase has already faded or not. We would be able to give an unambiguous answer only after we receive data for the first quarter. So far, we can see that price growth peaked over the first two weeks of January, waning in the second half of the month. I would like to reiterate that this estimate is based on incomplete weekly data. Additionally, I would like to note that full monthly data for January will show an acceleration in some measures of underlying inflation, for example, core inflation. Why? Because it is impossible to strip out all the effects of increased VAT from these measures of underlying inflation. Therefore, the acceleration should not be interpreted as an upward reversal in underlying inflation.
As for the risks to inflation stemming from second-round effects of the tax measures on inflation, these risks have not risen so far. This is evident from the dynamics of inflation expectations. In January, households’ expectations remained unchanged, while companies’ price expectations declined considerably in February after their surge in January and even returned to the levels of last October. Overall, our baseline scenario still assumes that underlying inflation will be around 4% in the second half of the year.
Secondly, the economy.
Full-year economic growth in 2025 was 1%, which is the upper bound of our forecast. These dynamics are generally in line with our expectations: the growth rate of economic activity has become more moderate.
At the end of 2025, consumer demand expectedly picked up, which was due to the anticipated increases in the recycling fee and VAT. Consumers were seeking to make expensive purchases earlier, before prices rise. Accordingly, we expect the situation to reverse at the beginning of 2026, that is, consumer activity will moderate. These expectations are justified by, among other things, the high-frequency data of the Bank of Russia’s monitoring of businesses for January and February.
As regards investments, companies were expanding them at a record pace over the past three years, which translated into new projects that are now at commissioning stage. They will support the growth of the economy’s potential, even though investment dynamics are becoming more moderate. Their heterogeneity across industries remains high. Specifically, sectors related to exports and transportation expect investments to decline from the high levels of previous years. Nonetheless, there are also industries planning to increase investments. We have revised our 2026 investment forecast slightly downwards, but still expect positive dynamics.
The gradual slowdown in economic activity is accompanied by labour market easing. Unemployment stays at its record lows. However, the percentage of companies referring to staff shortages as their main constraint has notably contracted and is currently at the minimum level over the past two years. Furthermore, companies’ wage indexation plans are now more modest than last year. All these are signs that the pressure put by the labour market on businesses’ costs has been weakening.
Our GDP growth forecast in the baseline scenario has remained unchanged. The key trends in the economy have generally stayed the same.
Thirdly, monetary conditions.
Briefly, they have continued to ease, while remaining tight. Although yields on federal government bonds and money market rates have edged up, real interest rates have stayed almost unchanged taking into account the rise in market participants’ inflation expectations. Loan and deposit rates have been declining in both nominal and real terms.
Corporate lending was expanding moderately in December 2025–January 2026, after the elevated growth rates observed in the autumn months. This was associated with the seasonal dynamics of budget spending. At the end of the year, companies usually receive payments under the fulfilled government contracts, while the beginning of the year is the time of advance payments under new contracts. During these periods, certain enterprises’ need for market loans temporarily decreases, although this is a normal seasonal effect.
Contrastingly, retail lending accelerated slightly, predominantly driven by mortgages. The rise in the demand for housing mortgage loans was triggered by the expected tightening of the subsidised programme terms. However, this was frontloaded demand, and accordingly, it may adjust downwards further on.
Households’ saving activity remains high, while the structure of savings has been changing slightly. In addition to deposits, households’ interest in other forms of savings, primarily financial market instruments, is increasing. This trend is quite natural at the stage of monetary policy easing. I would like to note that savings in the economy should be analysed in total, taking into account both deposits and other instruments. Overall, the saving ratio stays high, and the shifts in saving’s structure do not change this fact.
Overall, the accumulated effect of tight monetary conditions creates prerequisites for inflation to slow down to 4%.
Briefly about external conditions.
Trade disputes and global market fragmentation have not had a considerable impact on the current situation so far, although their effects might still manifest themselves in the future. The world economy has continued to expand at a rather sustainable pace overall, supporting the demand for a wide range of commodities.
The situation in the crude oil market is different. Last year, oil supply was soaring, which has created a surplus in the global market and is now exerting pressure on prices. The situation for Russian exporters is complicated by sanctions. In view of the global market trends, we have reduced our forecast of oil prices for the next three years. Accordingly, we have also adjusted the forecast of the value of Russian exports.
The ruble exchange rate has remained stable. Although oil producers faced a decline in their export earnings, this was partially offset by earnings from other exports. The ruble remains attractive overall, which is and will be supported by the fiscal rule and sound monetary policy.
I will now speak of risks.
The balance of risks remains shifted towards proinflationary ones.
The main proinflationary risks are still associated with a longer-lasting deviation of the Russian economy upwards from its balanced growth path and elevated inflation expectations. In January, households’ expectations did not respond to increased VAT. However, we cannot rule out the possibility of these effects in the upcoming months.
Crude oil prices also involve serious risks. If oil prices do not rebound from their current levels to those assumed in our baseline scenario, this might accelerate inflation through the exchange rate channel.
Proinflationary risks stemming from the labour market have somewhat weakened, according to our assessment.
As always, we put a particular focus on fiscal policy – both federal and regional policies. The parameters of fiscal policy enshrined in the law suggest its strong disinflationary effect this year. However, the situation might develop differently and deviate from the forecast, for example in terms of non-oil and gas revenues. If the non-oil and gas deficit increases, we may have less room for cutting the key rate.
Disinflationary risks remain as well, the key one of which is a more considerable slowdown in domestic demand growth.
Winding up, I would like to comment on our future decisions.
At the upcoming meetings, we will assess the need for a further key rate cut. The baseline scenario assumes that the key rate will average 13.5–14.5% in 2026. Our updated forecast suggests that, next year, the key rate should be maintained at a slightly higher level of 8–9% for inflation to return to the target sustainably. This is needed because inflation expectations have been persistently heightened. Over the past four years, when proinflationary shocks have been preventing inflation from declining to the target, inflation expectations have become persistently elevated. They will be decreasing rather slowly, including due to significant indexations of the administered services and tariffs in the next few years.
Taking into account all these factors, other things being equal, we should reduce the key rate more smoothly. This will make it possible to bring underlying inflation back to 4% and return the economy to a balanced growth path in the second half of the year.
Thank you for your attention.
Q&A for the Media
QUESTION from TASS:
Is it possible to say that we have passed the peak of inflationary pressures? Can we cautiously say that we have passed the peak of inflation expectations as well?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We believe that the peak of inflationary pressures was observed in January 2026. As for underlying inflation, it peaked in December 2024, in our opinion.
As regards the peak of inflation expectations, we will be closely monitoring them. As I have said, the tax increases may still feed through to inflation expectations. Nonetheless, we believe that second-round effects will be limited. Hopefully, we have passed the peak of inflation expectations as well. However, what is important to us is the pace of their decrease since they stayed at a rather high level throughout 2025 and remain at this level so far.
QUESTION from Interfax:
What are the reasons for today’s decision on monetary easing and how is it possible to explain why market participants were wrong expecting the Bank of Russia to keep the key rate unchanged and give a neutral signal? Some experts expected a reduction, while not assuming that it will be accompanied by a dovish signal. Would it be true to say that their only mistake was overestimating the impact of higher VAT on January inflation and getting startled by these figures at the beginning of the year? Don’t you change your estimate of the overall effect of increased VAT on prices at 0.6–0.7 percentage points?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As regards analysts, I don’t think they were wrong. Speaking of their expectations around the middle of last week, indeed, three in four analysts, i.e. 75% of them, expected the key rate to be kept unchanged, while others believed it would be cut.
However, we received new, quite important data this week. These are Rosstat’s statistics for December 2025, preliminary data on monetary aggregates for January 2026, and the findings of the Bank of Russia’s monitoring of businesses showing the estimates of demand and the pace of the decline in price expectations. By the way, we observed similar dynamics of businesses’ price expectations in 2019 when their surge gave way to a decrease as the effects of higher VAT waned. Currently, the dynamics are very much the same.
Additionally, we received statistics on weekly inflation, which are certainly incomplete, as we always emphasise, but at least they did not contain any obvious causes for cautiousness. I think that economists analysing these data saw the same. Some of them adjusted their expectations, as we could see. Financial markets shifted their expectations as well, and the key rate of 15.5% was generally priced in interest rates. Hence, our decisions seem to be consistent with market expectations.
As for the signal, we are now more confident that we will be able to continue cutting the key rate at the upcoming meetings. This also relates to the forecast path of the key rate in our baseline scenario, that is, we bring the signal in line with this path.
Nonetheless, I would like to reiterate that, giving a signal, we do not pre-commit to reducing the key rate at any particular meeting, but rather say that we will assess the need to further cut the key rate following a data-dependent approach. This is what we mean.
As regards the overall impact of VAT on prices, previously, it mostly translated into prices in January, while the effect on prices in December was smaller. We can see that, this time, the pass-through in December 2025 was minimal, maybe even smaller than previously.
In December 2025, we said that the pass-through would generally exceed 0.7 percentage points because it was necessary to factor in the difference between this increase in VAT and the previous one. Firstly, higher VAT affects a wider range of goods. Secondly, due to a reduction in the threshold amount for applying the simplified taxation system, much more companies must now pay VAT across a broader range of operations, e.g. VAT on acquiring and banking transactions which are also passed along.
However, more precise assessments of the impact of VAT, including both direct and potential second-round effects, will probably be available no earlier than the end of 2026 Q1.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
Definitely not earlier, and maybe even later. Indeed, it is more important for us to know not the exact contribution of VAT to January price growth (as that would ultimately be a judgement and a model-based estimate anyway), but rather the magnitude of this effect on price dynamics in February–March, inflation expectations, and the pace of their decrease throughout 2026.
It is true that we have passed the peak of inflation expectations, but what is critical for monetary policy is how fast and to what extent they will be fading in the future.
Furthermore, possibly, after raising prices due to higher VAT, some retailers might have seen that consumers are not ready to them and their sales have started to stall, and therefore, they have decided to scale back the increase. Therefore, I would rather say that we will only be able to reliably assess the impact of VAT closer to the middle of the year.
QUESTION from Izvestia:
If actual inflation slows faster than forecast, but inflation expectations remain heightened at a double-digit level, which of these two factors will be more important to you in decision-making?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As you know, we analyse inflation and inflation expectations and they are interconnected. If inflation is sufficiently low and reaches our target, while inflation expectations stay high and people make their decisions based on their expectations, the risk that inflation will not stabilise at 4% will be elevated. In other words, all else being equal, high inflation expectations mean less room for cutting the key rate.
Nevertheless, we firmly believe that if inflation stays close to the target for a long time, inflation expectations will inevitably begin to go down. This will be possibly a slower process than over the previous period. I have already spoken of this and the reasons for this, namely, sticky inflation and elevated tariff indexations. Nonetheless, these two indicators will be converging. Of course, we will take into account them both.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
What would happen if we ignore inflation expectations and only factor in actual price growth? This would not cause a reduction in inflation expectations and disinflation, but would only accelerate the increase in credit, demand, and ultimately, inflation since interest rates will remain low amid persistently high inflation expectations. Finally, the result would be the opposite of what is intended, whereas what we intend to achieve is price stability and balanced economic growth.
QUESTION from Reuters:
What were the options the Bank of Russia considered today? Did you discuss a reduction by more than 50 basis points? Is it possible that the step this year would be larger than 50 basis points?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We considered two alternatives: keeping the key rate unchanged and reducing it by 0.5 percentage points. These were the two options we discussed.
Those arguing for keeping the key rate unchanged primarily explained this choice by the fact that the data for December 2025 and January 2026 were rather noisy and more information was needed to be confident in a sustainable return of inflation to 4%.
Contrastingly, those advocating a key rate cut relied on a rather wide range of survey data. It is worth noting that, for instance, the findings of the monitoring of businesses, which are more forward-looking in nature, later on correlate sufficiently well with statistics, and it is therefore quite reasonable to rely on these findings.
As for possible steps, we do not comment on them, as you know. Depending on the situation, a step might be larger, but pauses are possible as well, including within the baseline scenario. Hence, everything will depend on the incoming data.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
I would even not exclude the probability of a change by 0.25 percentage points if we have good reasons for this.
QUESTION from Narodnaya Gazeta (Ulyanovsk):
Our readers are now more concerned about mortgage rates and housing affordability. It is common knowledge that market interest rates on mortgage loans today significantly exceed the key rate, equalling almost 21% on mortgages for existing housing. When do you forecast a decrease in mortgage rates to the level that would enable a family in a Russian region to buy housing – to 12–15% at least?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Indeed, the affordability of mortgages is crucial. However, we believe that mortgage loans will really become affordable for a wide range of households when inflation decelerates sustainably and when, which is equally important, people make sure that inflation will stay low for long.
So far, market rates on mortgages remain really high, although they edged down below 20% by the end of last year, I should say. Of course, this is still a high level. Let’s see why and when market rates can go down. For this, it is necessary to understand the factors influencing these interest rates. In the first place, this is the cost of money raised by a bank from households and organisations, which is currently 13–15%. Adding to this interest rate the premiums for credit risk and interest rate risk as well as a bank’s expenses, we get these 18–20% offered by banks on market mortgages. Thus, a lot depends on deposit rates, that is, the percentage paid by banks, while they directly depend on inflation and inflation expectations.
You would agree that, opening a deposit account, a person expects that the interest rate on the deposit offered by the bank will protect the money against inflation. If the person expects inflation of about 14%, which is close to today’s figures, the deposit rate should be in line with these expectations. Therefore, mortgage rates cannot decrease fast amid high inflation expectations.
Nevertheless, we forecast that inflation will stabilise close to 4% already next year. Of course, inflation should stay at this low level for some time for people to become confident that this is a sustainable trend, which will ultimately influence the affordability of mortgages.
I would like to remind you that mortgages were affordable in 2018–2019. By the way, during that period, mortgage rates were below 10% and not 12–15%, as you’ve said, but this was associated with the fact that we had been keeping inflation at a very low level, even slightly below 4%, from 2017. However, today’s situation cannot be compared directly with 2017–2019. As the saying goes, you cannot step into the same river twice. There were no large-scale subsidised mortgage lending programmes then.
I have to repeat again and again that the larger is the amount of subsidised lending in the economy the higher must be market interest rates on loans, because otherwise, inflation will be accelerating. The amount of subsidised lending is quite large: last year, the disbursements of subsidised loans totalled ₽3.6 trillion. Hence, in these conditions, interest rates on market mortgages will apparently be higher than in 2017–2019. Speaking of the scale of subsidised lending, back in 2019, it amounted to about ₽120 billion.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
To understand how significantly subsidised mortgage lending influences the average mortgage rate across the country, the average interest rate on a mortgage loan in Russia is 7.5%. This is the average of 6% under the Family Mortgage programme and the current level of market interest rates, but the average rate for Russian citizens today is 7.5% per annum.
QUESTION from Market Power project:
In recent years, we have observed quite a few situations where minority shareholders’ rights were violated, and the Bank of Russia always stepped in to protect them. However, this raises the following question: isn’t it necessary today to create special units that would protect minority shareholders’ rights or appoint a dedicated ombudsman for resolving these issues?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As for special units, although I do not know whether you are talking of the Bank of Russia or a separate organisation, I do not think that this will change the situation related to protecting minority shareholders’ rights, since this is rather an issue of legal regulation and law enforcement.
Generally, there are ombudsmen protecting entrepreneurs’ rights. I do not think that appointing another ombudsman will change the situation notably. Nevertheless, as part of its mandate, the Bank of Russia will continue protecting minority shareholders’ rights since we believe this is critical for boosting investment in the country. If we want to have not only investment from the budget and companies’ profits, but also investment from equity funding, which plays a great role in investment in many countries, we certainly need to protect minority shareholders’ rights. We will continue these efforts.
QUESTION from Rossiyskaya Gazeta:
I’ve got another question to continue the topic of mortgages. You have given clear explanations, but last year, you were frequently asked such questions and answered that a smooth key rate reduction would not cause a surge in the demand for mortgages or a significant effect on prices. However, at the end of last year, the demand for mortgages soared both in the new and existing housing markets, which means that, for some reasons, people raised market mortgages at an interest rate of 19%, 20%, or even higher. How could you explain this consumer behaviour and do you take it into account when making key rate decisions? Do you expect a new spike in the demand for market mortgages and the demand for existing housing as the key rate is cut further?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We do not see a rise in the demand for market mortgages at the end of the year. Overall, the demand did increase, but that was mainly on account of subsidised mortgages. Indeed, higher demand accelerated the growth of housing prices, but we do not put this down to the key rate reduction.
A decrease in interest rates certainly caused a slight rise in the demand for market mortgages, but according to our assessment, the main driver was subsidised mortgage lending. New housing prices rose by 8.7% last year, which is higher than inflation, and the demand started to grow faster, since households were expecting subsidised lending terms to be tightened.
We observed such acceleration in the past as well: when the Government began to discuss tightening of subsidised lending terms, the demand for mortgages was growing faster, but that rise in the demand for housing mortgages was transitory in the past. We believe that it will not last long now either.
Speaking of Moscow, for example, there are specific factors here: the proportion of new housing in late stages of construction has increased, which is translating into prices since it is cheaper to buy housing at the site preparation phase than in a late stage of construction.
However, as regards higher prices and the influence of subsidised mortgages on them, we may compare price growth rates in the new and existing housing markets. The existing housing market, where the impact of subsidised mortgages is minimal, did not see a notable increase in prices in 2025, with the annual growth rate of existing housing prices reaching 3.9%, which is below inflation, while in Moscow it was even 1.5%. We can see that the existing housing market is more flexible, adaptive.
Of course, we do factor in the situation in the housing market: although real estate prices are not included in the inflation index, they might affect consumer price growth through various channels, such as lending to developers, higher profits, investment demand from construction companies, amounts of related expenses on furniture, etc. Sure enough, we analyse and take into account all this information.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
Soaring demand at the end of the year was provoked by concerns about changes to the Family Mortgage terms introduced from 1 February 2026.
And another aspect. In terms of the impact of monetary conditions on the demand and prices for housing, the existing housing market is still much more illustrative than the new housing market. Why? This is because the average price for new housing in each location, in each city depends on the stage of construction, as well as on the range of projects offered for sale at a particular moment. Therefore, the market experiences ongoing structural changes and fluctuations in the supply of new housing, and as a matter of fact, this significantly contributes to year-on-year price dynamics.
QUESTION from Bloomberg:
My question is about the possible confiscation of Russian assets. The Bank of Russia has already started the protection, filing a lawsuit against Euroclear to a Russian court. Is Russia ready to confiscate anything from the European Union in response to the confiscation of Russian assets? Mass media reported that, as a retaliatory measure, Russia might confiscate the assets belonging to Norway’s sovereign wealth fund and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Is this true? How large is the portion of the European assets under Russia’s control that it is ready to confiscate in response? Is it more or less than 200 billion, according to your estimate? And another short question please. Is the Bank of Russia exploring the scenario of restoring the economic partnership with the United States and preparing to resume settlements for Russian exports in US dollars?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As for retaliatory measures in case foreign countries illegally seize Russia’s gold and foreign currency reserves, these measures are to be approved by the President.
As I have said many times earlier, we do not disclose the amount we control.
Speaking of potential development of the relations with the United States, we do not have such information. As the central bank, we do not participate in this, at least so far.
QUESTION from Igor Shimko media project:
My question is as follows. Today, when funding is rather expensive, quite a large number of businesses are actually at the edge, with some of them defaulting and some closing. How does the Bank of Russia Board of Directors take into account this pressure and potential losses for businesses when making its key rate decisions? What mechanisms do you use to monitor this?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Indeed, businesses’ debt servicing costs have risen, but for a vast majority of companies, except the most leveraged ones, costs are mostly driven not by interest expenses. When a company’s debt is not large and its development plans are commensurate with its own resources, expenses of such companies (which form a vast majority, as I have said) are pushed up by a rise in the so-called operating costs, that is, higher prices for raw materials and components, etc. This increase stems from high inflation, which is exactly what we combat through a high key rate.
If monetary policy were excessively restrictive, what would happen? Demand would plummet below potential, below the capacities of production facilities and labour resources to manufacture products. If this happened, inflation would decelerate very sharply, deviating downwards from the target, and the more so, not for a short while (because, sometimes, e.g. in summer, we can observe a seasonal decline in prices), but for an extended period.
If we predicted this and saw such risk, we would certainly be easing monetary conditions and reducing the key rate faster. It is therefore crucial for us not only to scrutinise inflation and inflation expectations but also to analyse the economy, businesses. The Bank of Russia conducts the monitoring of businesses. We take into account the totality of factors to forecast future developments and adjust our monetary policy, the key rate path accordingly.
Today, we do not see any preconditions for such a scenario. The current key rate decrease (as you remember, we have cut the key rate by 5.5 percentage points since mid-2025) is sufficiently smooth but substantial. Our baseline scenario also assumes a key rate reduction which will support businesses.
QUESTION from Economikal channel on Telegram:
My question is about unemployment. It is currently at a record low, but it is a proinflationary factor since the maximum number of people of the total working-age population currently earn wages, and therefore, can use this money thus forming demand. This is the first aspect.
The second aspect is that people now hold an equivalent of their pent-up demand in deposits, and their amounts are quite large. The economy might thus face a situation when we achieve the inflation target of 4.5% and the key rate decreases, but people will still have a lot of work and this pent-up demand and will therefore use these deposits or start raising loans (since they all have jobs and wages), which will ultimately trigger the risk of the second wave of high inflation. Does the Bank of Russia take into account such a situation, such a scenario, and how are you going to prevent it in the future?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
I would like to make a small correction: our inflation target is 4%.
The amount of savings and the saving ratio are really high now. However, we do not interpret this as pent-up demand that consumers will start to realise immediately after the key rate decrease. Why? The reason is that a considerable rise in real wages has enabled households to make savings without reducing consumption, that is, their consumption and savings have both increased. Thus, consumption was up by 3.4% last year. Speaking of the period of low inflation, consumption growth then was about 2.3%. In other words, consumption has been rising, and savings have increased not because of zero growth in consumption.
The inflow of funds into deposits continues amid lower interest rates since people see that these rates protect the purchasing power of their savings. As interest rates go down, the saving ratio will be declining gradually, which is normal and the way it should be. However, this only means that people will be saving a smaller portion of their future incomes, rather than they will be withdrawing funds from deposits and spend this money.
As I have already said, we make cautious and prudent decisions, which will help prevent any sharp changes in savings. This also affects the attractiveness of loans. By the way, we can see that, in the retail segment, only mortgage lending expanded at the end of the year. Other loans are not growing.
What you are talking about is indeed a bottleneck. A record low unemployment rate is a good thing, but in such a situation, potential economic growth will be determined by labour productivity growth, which thus becomes the key factor. This is why the measures taken by the Government to encourage higher labour productivity are so important.
QUESTION from RIA Novosti:
Does the Bank of Russia support the State Duma’s proposal to make all real estate transactions cashless? Does the Bank of Russia see any implications of the so-called Dolina effect for the real estate market? And my last question is not about real estate. When will the key rate be single-digit?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Answering the third question, we have a forecast of the key rate for the next year: it will average 8–9% per annum.
As regards the State Duma’s proposals, we have not seen any particular proposals so far. What I can say is that the development of cashless settlements is certainly important. I would like to remind you that the ratio of cash and cashless transactions in Russia has notably changed since 2015. In 2015, cashless settlements made up 30%, whereas now, their share reaches 88%. This result has been achieved not through bans but because cashless transactions have become more convenient, cheaper, and so on. Therefore, we believe that acting this way is critical. We should look at what is proposed in particular.
What I am wary of is that possible bans on cash settlements in this area might move the price of transactions into shady territory, which means that contract prices for cashless payments might be understated, whereas the remaining portion might be paid in cash separately. This issue should be explored. So far, it would be premature to draw any conclusions.
As for your second question, we do not observe a systemic effect now since the situation was generally resolved.
QUESTION from Bitkogan project:
The Bank of Russia has significantly reduced its forecast of the crude price for tax purposes. In view of this, my question is as follows: how does the Bank of Russia assess the risk of depletion of the liquid part of the National Wealth Fund? Is this risk proinflationary and what will the Bank of Russia do if it materialises?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Our scenario of the crude price forecast does not assume that the National Wealth Fund’s resources might be depleted over the forecast horizon.
QUESTION from Expert:
As the key rate decreases, deposit rates offered by banks will go down as well. Does the Bank of Russia see any risks in this regard? For how long will it be profitable to hold deposits and what would you recommend to do with the savings after that?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We do not see any risks associated with a reduction in deposit rates that could make deposits unattractive for savings. When cutting the key rate, we take into account inflation expectations, among other things. As I have already said, deposit rates should be consistent with inflation expectations.
We reckon that inflation expectations will be declining as inflation decelerates. Deposit rates, even if they drop, will remain attractive since they will protect deposits against depreciation due to inflation. When inflation was low, people also held their funds with banks, even at much lower deposit rates.
Redistribution of savings is possible, as I have said, that is, part of the funds might move to financial markets. We can see that the demand for financial market instruments is currently growing, but these are still household savings.
QUESTION from BelPressa (Belgorod):
Already at the end of last year, there was a large number of entrepreneurs who were wary of fiscal policy tightening, including higher VAT, causing a new wave of inflation not only in early 2026, but also later on, that is, entailing a delayed effect, as well as of further decisions on tax increases and higher tax burden. Do you see this risk and how serious is it? Aren’t such decisions contradicting the Bank of Russia’s strategy for bringing inflation back to the target?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
No, we do not see such risk. Neither do we expect a new wave of inflation. Indeed, the tax changes expectedly triggered a rise in prices in January 2026. However, that was a one-off spike in prices, rather than an emerging trend of faster inflation.
As I have already said, we believe that the tax changes largely translated into inflation in January 2026. We will be able to give a more accurate assessment of this effect later, but we expect that disinflation will resume and price growth will equal 4.5–5.5% as of the end of the year, while underlying inflation will approximate 4% as early as 2026 H2. The VAT increase did cause a shift in the level of prices in the short term, but it will have a disinflationary effect in the long run. If we compare it with financing the deficit not through higher taxes but through larger borrowings, the latter would definitely be proinflationary.
Speaking of a new wave of inflation, you possibly mean that businesses will have to pass on higher costs associated with the tax changes to prices, but we can see that they would only be able to fully pass along their costs in the conditions of soaring overheated demand. Otherwise, the rise in costs caused by increased taxes may result either in lower profits or in cutting other expenses.
It is worth noting that, according to our monitoring, businesses do not expect a new wave of inflation acceleration. To the contrary, in February 2026, companies considerably reduced their price expectations, which returned to last year’s level, although it remains elevated.
QUESTION from RBC:
There is an opinion that, due to increased tax burden and VAT, some businesses, some small enterprises might use either cash settlements or some other payment methods to replace part of their card transactions in order to ensure optimisation to a certain extent. Does the Bank of Russia see such implications? Are your recording a rise in cash payments or in the use of any payment alternatives?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
It would be now premature to speak of a potential effect of the tax changes on the structure of settlements, including cash and cashless payments, and of the extent to which the risk of shadowing could materialise. The tax modifications became effective from 1 January 2026, and therefore, we do not have sufficient data so far to give such assessments. Nevertheless, we will be continuously monitoring this to analyse the trends and draw conclusions. Currently, it would be too early to do this.
QUESTION from Frank Media:
In its new forecast, the Bank of Russia has shifted the inflation target to 2027 and this is not the first time in recent years that you do this. Don’t you think that such shifts might involve the risk of market participants losing confidence in the Bank of Russia’s ability to attain the inflation target, and consequently, the risk of inflation expectations going up again? If yes, did you consider this risk in the course of the deliberations and why did you decide to ignore it?
I’ve also got a clarifying question. As you have noted, Rosstat has not released its January statistics yet. Did the Bank of Russia use its own estimates and what were they?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Firstly, we have not shifted the target, we do not change it, because the target is what must be kept unchanged, but in terms of annual inflation, indeed, the target will be achieved in 2027.
What do we consider essential? It is essential for underlying inflation to return to the target sustainably. I am talking exactly about underlying inflation, rather than the inflation rate which is inevitably fluctuating due to the impact of transitory factors, while we have a lot of them, including both demand- and supply-side factors. According to our forecast, this will happen already this year, namely in 2026 H2.
We have increased our annual inflation estimate by 0.5 percentage points now only due to the fact that the impact of higher VAT turned out to be concentrated in January 2026. As I have already said, inflation in December 2025 was below our forecast. Another factor in December 2025 was the volatility of fruit and vegetable prices. We spoke of that as well. In December 2025, they declined considerably, including because of the warm weather, but then went up in January 2026. Thus, the effect of these transitory factors shifted to January 2026. However, in terms of underlying inflation dynamics, we have not revised our estimates.
As for confidence, it is critical. It is also very important that you are raising this question. The anchoring of inflation expectations at a rather high level is definitely a consequence of persistently high inflation deviating from the target over recent years.
Therefore, it is crucial for us to lower inflation expectations so as to be confident in achieving the target sustainably. Due to last years’ trend, inflation expectations will be decreasing more slowly, unfortunately. Thus, everything comes at a price. The fact that inflation was rather high during that period means that decreasing the resulting inflation expectations requires tighter monetary policy.
If inflation expectations were anchored at a low level and did not respond to a one-off spike in prices, our monetary policy, all else being equal, could be looser to ensure the same inflation rate of 4%. However, we do not ignore this. To the contrary, we take this into account, including by adjusting the key rate path for the next year as we are aware that, due to the impact of these factors, inflation expectations will be declining more slowly.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
I would like to repeat what is written in the press release and what the Governor said in her statement about these dynamics in November–December 2025 and January 2026.
Our October forecast assumed that inflation would equal 6.5–7% as of the end of 2025 and 4–5% as of the end of 2026. However, in reality, due to the weather in November–December 2025, cucumber and tomato prices were not rising at all or were rising but much more slowly than normally during that period of the year. Furthermore, the growth of prices for other products was apparently contained as well, since companies were seeking not to leave large stocks for the next year and were, therefore, selling them at larger discounts. Overall, the price growth rate in November–December 2025 was much lower than predicted by both the Bank of Russia and others when we were analysing it in October 2025.
Annual inflation turned out to be 5.6% in December 2025 instead of 6.5–7%. Accordingly, we expect it to reach 4.5–5.5% as of the end of this year. However, 5.6% plus 4.5–5.5% is less than 6.5–7%, which we predicted as of the end of 2025, plus 4–5%. In other words, despite this redistribution, cumulative inflation over the two years will be lower than the rate assumed in October 2025. Inflation dynamics are currently below the October forecast. This is really important.
One can also think of this in another way: the forecast for the end of 2025 was 6.5%–7%, while weekly data show that annual inflation is currently 6.3%, which is lower than our forecast of annual inflation at the beginning of this year.
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Before the spike in prices due to higher VAT.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
That was just redistribution between these two calendar years of inflation which is now below the forecast released last October.
QUESTION from Delovye Novosti, NTV channel:
I would like to speak of the weather. In 2022, your colleagues from the European Central Bank introduced the term ‘climateflation’ when extreme weather events affect prices. Of course, my question is about the snow. Have the snowfalls of January–February 2026 already impacted inflation? Can they influence inflation in the future? If there is no such thing as good or bad weather, as we all know, is there bad weather for inflation in Russia?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
The weather is definitely an important factor. Indeed, weather shifts affect price fluctuations, especially in the food market. By the way, one can see that food prices fluctuate much more significantly, are characterised by more substantial fluctuations than non-food prices.
Cold weather in January involves higher greenhouse heating costs which translate into prices quite quickly. On the other hand, a snowy winter is usually good for the harvest, which is why the harvest outlook for 2026 is positive so far. Overall, the weather influences the harvest a lot, and according to specialists, heatwaves in certain periods may affect not only crop yields, but also animal production. Therefore, the weather really impacts inflation. Unfortunately, weather shifts are inevitable, and all countries have to face them.
By the way, food prices in a number of economies, if these are open markets, are affected not only by the weather in respective countries, but also by global food prices.
Nevertheless, if monetary policy is able to ensure low inflation and maintain it at a low level, these year-to-year fluctuations, which are unfortunately unavoidable, would not lead to an overall increase in prices in a given product group. In other words, prices may surge during one year but then decline during another year. However, on average, over a longer period, prices grow close to the headline inflation rate.
Of course, significant price growth is a matter of concern to everyone. Speaking of potato prices over the past five years, for instance, there were years when they rose by 90% a year, which is notably higher than inflation, but there were also years when potato prices declined by 30%, which is considerably below inflation as well. However, over the five years in general, the increase in potato prices was less significant than average inflation over that period.
Thus, fluctuations do happen, but I would like to repeat that keeping inflation low does not reduce these fluctuations, but rather ensures that they do not entail an overall rise in prices.
QUESTION from InvestFuture project:
My question is about gold. In recent months, we have been observing, first, very serious fluctuations of price growth and, second, an actual increase in gold prices. I am wondering how this precious metal is currently affecting the Russian economy and the ruble. In connection with the growth of gold prices, mass media report that Russia has managed to almost completely set off its losses caused by the freezing of assets. Do you take into account the gold market in your monetary policy decisions and how? What role does this metal play in Russia today?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
I will first speak of the gold in our gold and foreign currency reserves. We have quite a large share of gold, in contrast to many other countries. Therefore, when the gold price rises, the revaluation of gold naturally increases the value of our gold and foreign currency reserves.
Speaking of a broader effect of gold prices on the economy, just like crude oil, gold is also an export commodity, although the related export earnings are smaller. When we prepare our forecast of the balance of payments, we rather focus on the price for crude oil since it is a more important commodity, but nonetheless, we analyse the entire range of Russian exports and the forecasts of export quantities, prices, and accordingly, the balance of payments as a whole. In other words, we take into account gold as an export commodity.
QUESTION from Investment / Alina Karashova channel on Telegram (Yaroslavl):
My question is about corporate lending. In 2025 H2, corporate lending notably expanded, with its growth rate significantly exceeding that of 2025 H1. The surge was recorded in October and November 2025. The slowdown in December 2025, as you noted, was rather associated with the fulfilment of government contracts, i.e. it was generally typical of the year-end period. My question is as follows. Why there is no sustainable deceleration in corporate lending, despite the long-lasting cycle of tight monetary policy, in the Bank of Russia’s opinion?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
The expansion of corporate lending has been slowing down. This is obvious when comparing the figures for 2025 and 2024 in general. The dynamics of corporate lending are broadly consistent with our forecast for last year, exceeding the upper bound only slightly.
Indeed, the growth of corporate lending somewhat accelerated in 2025 H2, but that was to be expected. We have already talked about the seasonal dynamics of budget spending. Furthermore, that also makes sense considering the reduction in the key rate and loan rates in the economy in general.
Speaking of the impact of this factor on inflation, we have emphasised many times and I would like to reiterate now that what matters to us is not only the growth rate of lending, and of corporate lending in particular (although it surged during some periods and we were certainly monitoring the process and the persistence of the trends), but also the flows of budgetary funds.
I would like to stress that, while corporate lending slightly exceeded our forecast, the annualised growth rate of money supply, which also factors in the inflow of money through the budget channel, declined more significantly compared to corporate lending, with the dynamics of monetary aggregates being totally consistent with our forecast.
No, we do not observe any serious risks related to corporate lending, but we have the finger on the pulse and will respond adequately if they emerge.
QUESTION from Dengi Ne Spyat project:
My question is about the housing market. As long as a large developer applied for government support and, consequently, market instruments, such as developers’ shares and bonds, were very volatile that day, this caused some anxiety among private investors. What is important for private investors is to know how the Bank of Russia assesses the risks of the construction industry. Are there such risks and what are they?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We monitor the financial position of major developers. We can see that the majority of the largest developers and the industry as a whole remain resilient overall. Indeed, some companies are facing problems, but they are not sectoral. The source of this problems is outstanding debts accumulated by these companies over previous periods rather than the situation in the industry as a whole.
The situation in the housing market is sufficiently stable, which is obvious from the statistics. The risks that many were talking about at the beginning of 2025, that is, the risk of an overall decline and so on, have not materialised. Housing sales are growing both in value and physical terms. They have increased by 11% in value terms, and by 1% in physical terms, but this is still growth.
Developers receive financing, they have a special mechanism of project financing, that is, funds in escrow accounts. Interest rates on project financing are quite moderate, currently slightly exceeding 10% on average, depending on the balances in escrow accounts.
What is also important is that escrow accounts protect households. Banks really want construction projects to be completed since they are involved in project financing.
Therefore, we do not see any systemic risks in this area. The situation is totally stable across the industry as a whole.
QUESTION from Russia 24:
How extensively is the Bank of Russia using neural networks in its work? If it uses them, for what purposes? How accurate are their forecasts, their models compared to human experts’ opinions?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
We try not to stand apart from new technologies. As you know, banks and the financial market as a whole are actively deploying quite advanced innovations, including artificial intelligence (AI), and I guess, people really feel that. Many financial institutions are thinking of innovations.
We are experimenting as well, using AI primarily as an assistant to human experts, for example, to simplify and improve data collection and analysis and reduce the related costs. This gives us a more comprehensive view of economic developments when we discuss monetary policy issues, among other things.
As regards macroeconomic forecasts, which we rely on when making our decisions, we consider that AI has a considerable limitation in this area so far. Why? The reason is that AI generally takes large arrays of data and draws conclusions based on historical data. If the economy is experiencing rapid changes, like now, any AI-based models, and generally any models, as I have already said many times, might give recommendations relying on these data series.
In other words, following these AI-based models, we might get trapped by the past, whereas we, to the contrary, are largely seeking to predict the future. Hence, AI can hardly replace a human expert’s critical look at the situation so far. When sudden events occur, human experts are absolutely irreplaceable. When we discuss our key rate decisions, what is critical to us is the pluralism of judgements and opinions, the diversity of arguments that we will be able to scrutinise, and collaborative analysis and decision-making, rather than what is generated by AI based on historical data.
We do use these models in analysis but we then discuss them anyway. These models, including the programme codes, which were requested by experts, are publicly available.
QUESTION from Moskovsky Komsomolets:
My question is about the 20th package of sanctions. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas said that the 20th package will impose sanctions on the digital ruble. How dangerous is this for the project? How is it possible at all given that it is not yet widely adopted in Russia? What can the EU really do to ban the digital ruble in terms of technology? Does the Bank of Russia’s digital ruble development strategy take into account the risks of unfriendly countries’ ban? This is my first question.
My second question is as follows. Many experts assert that a strong ruble contributes to low inflation, while the exchange rate in turn is positively influenced by the impossibility to ‘park’ funds abroad. In other words, the door is locked on the other side. The 20th package of sanctions will only strengthen the barrier. Accordingly, my question is as follows. Does the Bank of Russia forecast appreciation of the ruble in this connection and, if yes, how significant it may be? Does the regulator forecast a decline in inflation after the enactment of the 20th package of sanctions due to a stronger ruble?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As regards the digital ruble, these attempts to ban it seem strange to me. The digital ruble is a form of the national currency, just like cash and balances in accounts. Nobody is able to ban the national currency of any country and nobody can disrupt the technology either. Our project is progressing as scheduled. Its services are launched according to the plan.
I would like to remind you that it will be possible to use digital rubles, that is, open e-wallets and make money transfers and payments in large stores, from 1 September 2026. The introduction of the digital ruble by banks and retailers will progress in stages, but it will be possible to use digital rubles from 1 September 2026, and almost everything is ready for this.
As for cross-border transactions, we continue our dialogue with friendly states to arrange the interaction at the level of central bank digital currencies. We continue this work.
ALEXEY ZABOTKIN:
I would like to speak briefly about the exchange rate. Given the monetary policy pursued and all other factors, possibly those that you’ve mentioned as well, the exchange rate will ultimately be at a level consistent with low inflation at its target of 4%.
As we have said many times, the situation where inflation will be sustainably low also assumes that the national currency will be generally stable as well.
QUESTION from Arkhangelsk – City of Military Glory (Arkhangelsk):
Recently, Arkhangelsk has been recording such a trend as closures of public catering companies and retail outlets, including both standalone stores and points of sale in shopping malls. Accordingly, my question is as follows. Does the Bank of Russia observe a similar trend in other regions? What is the determinant in this situation? Is it possible to speak of some structural changes, such as pressure from marketplaces, or financial conditions, such as increased tax burden and the cost of borrowings?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
In our opinion, this is definitely the impact of structural factors. The structure of retail trade and public catering continues to alter significantly. You all can surely see that online purchases and home deliveries, including of ready meals, have become very widespread in recent years. All this is becoming increasingly popular. This is cheaper and more convenient. Generally, this is good for buyers and is boosting competition, marketplaces are intensifying competition, thus contributing to a decline in inflation.
However, you have mentioned closures of public catering places. I can say that the public catering industry is generally quite stable across the country, having grown by nearly 50% since 2021. This figure is in real terms, adjusted for inflation. Last year was no exception as public catering expanded by 9%.
The trends in the Arkhangelsk Region are very similar: the growth rate in public catering over 2025 was 8%, which is slightly below the country’s average, while the rate over the four years was 25%, which is also quite significant.
However, this industry is very much subject to changes and is characterised by high competition, while the new structure of the industry is making this competition even more pronounced. What does this mean? This means that, while one location closes, another one replaces it owing to its higher efficiency and convenience for buyers, which is normal.
As regards consumer demand in general, and not only public catering, it continues to grow as well both in the Arkhangelsk Region and countrywide. We do not observe any decline in consumer demand.
QUESTION from Anna Finance project:
I would like to continue the question of my colleague that you have partially answered already. It is about the developer that applied for government support. What is your opinion about such a large company facing problems? Should the Government provide aid to it or give a certain signal? What should the investors waiting for apartments from this developer expect?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Investors are protected by escrow accounts. As I have already said, banks want these construction projects to be completed and we are confident that this is the way it will go.
As for possible rehabilitation of large companies, whether to do this or not and how, this issue is within the mandate of the Government.
QUESTION from Vedomosti:
I would like to continue the question about developers, but to discuss another aspect. As of mid-2025, housing sales on developers’ instalment plans totalled nearly ₽1 trillion. Doesn’t the Bank of Russia see the beginning of payment defaults or cancellations of these contracts as the regulator has many times emphasised very high risks of such contracts because, in contrast to mortgaged housing, people are not protected when they buy housing on instalment plans.
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
As regards instalment plans, you are right saying that we have stressed such risks as these plans are temporary. Everyone expects subsequent relending, that is, a mortgage loan, but this does not happen automatically, which is certainly a matter of concern to us. We are closely monitoring the market.
I can say that the ratio of cancellations is currently stable, specifically no more than 5% at the moment. Of course, we will keep an eye on this situation.
By the way, we have recommended that banks should avoid a large proportion of instalment plans in projects and keep it at the minimal level.
QUESTION from PRO.FINANSY project:
As of 30 January 2026, Russia’s international reserves reached nearly $827 billion and increased by 5% over a week. Was this growth associated solely with the rise in the gold price by the same percentage or are there any other contributors to this?
ELVIRA NABIULLINA:
Recently, international reserves have been growing primarily as a result of positive revaluation, which is mostly attributed to a higher price for gold and the weakening of the US dollar against foreign currencies. There are no other factors behind this.
Thank you for your questions.